Can market failure cause political failure?

We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects voting on institutional reform. In contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform, we find that the preferences of these classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between surplus maximising and politically feasible institutional reforms

Can Market Failure Cause Political Failure?

We study how inefficiencies of market failure may be further amplified by political choices made by interest groups created in the inefficient market. We take an occupational choice framework, where agents are endowed heterogeneously with wealth and talent. In our model, market failure due to unobservability of talent endogenously creates a class structure that affects voting on institutional reform. In contrast to the world without market failure where the electorate unanimously vote in favour of surplus maximising institutional reform, we find that the preferences of these classes are often aligned in ways that creates a tension between surplus maximising and politically feasible institutional reforms.occupational choice, adverse selection, property rights, assetliquidation, political failure, market failure.

Regulating Shadows: Financial Regulation and Responsibility Failure

In the modern financial architecture, financial services and products increasingly are provided outside of the traditional banking system—and thus without the need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds. Most corporate financing, for example, no longer is dependent on bank loans but raised through special-purpose entities, money-market mutual funds, securities lenders, hedge funds, and investment banks. This shift, referred to as “disintermediation” and described as creating a “shadow banking” system, is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their assumptions. Two of the fundamental market failures underlying shadow banking—information failure and agency failure—were also prevalent in the bank-intermediated financial system. By amplifying systemic risk, however, disintermediation greatly increases the importance of what scholars long have viewed as a third market-failure category: externalities. Viewing externalities as a distinct category of market failure is misleading, though: externalities are fundamentally consequences, not causes, of failures; and all market failures can result in externalities. Focusing on externalities also obscures who should be responsible for causing the externalities. This article argues that the third market-failure category should be reconceptualized as a “responsibility failure”: a firm’s ability to externalize a significant portion of the costs of taking a risky action. That not only would more precisely describe the market failure but also would help to illuminate that sometimes the government itself, not merely individual firms, should bear responsibility for causing externalities, and that exercising this responsibility may require the government to enact laws that require firms to internalize those costs

Conflicts of interests in the conventional and Islamic securitisation

This article is available open access through the publisher’s website.The 2007-2008 financial crisis observed the demise of the securitisation market, and this caused doubts on the viability of conventional securitisation and its underlying ethos. In the wake of such a market failure the financial industry and legal scholars have been in search of alternatives to the conventional securitisation. Some suggested that Islamic securitisation could provide an answer to this market failure. In theoretical terms the most causes of the 2007-2008 crisis can be pin downed to market failures owing to conflict of interests of conventional securitisation. It is the instances of market failures that provide a justification for the new regulation to correct misaligned incentives1. In this scenario, when one resorts to the ‘Islamic securitisation’, it simply means resorting to this new regulation in the wake of the global market failure

"Market Failure and Land Concentration"

Utilizing a 2002 household-level World Bank Survey for rural Turkey, this paper explores the link between concentration of land ownership and rural factor markets. We construct a unique index that measures market malfunctioning based on the neoclassical model linking land and labor endowments through factor markets to household income. We further test whether land ownership concentration affects market malfunctioning. Our empirical investigation supports the claim that factor markets are structurally limited in reducing existing inequalities as a result of land ownership concentration. Our findings show that in the presence of land ownership inequality, malfunctioning rural factor markets result in increased land concentration, increased income inequality, and inefficient resource allocation. This work fills an important empirical gap within the development literature and establishes a positive association between asset inequality and factor market failure.

Health Interventions and Risky Behaviour

This paper reviews the extent to which policy interventions can affect risky behaviours such as smoking, drinking and diet. The justification for such intervention is typically a market failure, broadly defined. The types of market failure typically encountered are discussed. First and second best interventions are examined and there is a review of the efficacy of such interventions with respect to Ireland.Risky behaviour, market failure

Trade finance in crisis : market adjustment or market failure ?

As world leaders have agreed to massively support trade finance, this paper discusses the singularity of the issues related to trade finance in the context of the global economic crisis. Why should international trade finance be a particular issue of concern in the current circumstances? Are there specific market or government failures associated with trade finance that justify a special and differential treatment of the issue by policymakers? If so, what would then be the most appropriate policy instruments to address those concerns? The paper cautions against the notion of a large trade finance"gap,"yet highlights the possible rationales and conditions for an effective intervention in support of trade finance.Debt Markets,Banks&Banking Reform,Access to Finance,Emerging Markets,

Early Detection Techniques for Market Risk Failure

The implementation of appropriate statistical techniques for monitoring conditional VaR models, i.e, backtesting, reported by institutions is fundamental to determine their exposure to market risk. Backtesting techniques are important since the severity of the departures of the VaR model from market results determine the penalties imposed for inadequate VaR models. In this paper we make six contributions to backtesting techniques. In particular, we show that the Kupiec test can be viewed as a combination of CUSUM change point tests; we detail the lack of power of CUSUM methods in detecting violations of VaR as soon as these occur; we develop an alternative technique based on weighted U-statistic type processes that have power against wrong specifications of the risk measure and early detection; we show these new backtesting techniques are robust to the presence of estimation risk; we construct a new class of weight functions that can be used to weight our processes; and our methods are applicable both under conditional and unconditional VaR settings

Public and private roles in road infrastructure: an exploration of market failure, public instruments and government failure

Starting with a 'greenfield' situation, we discuss reasons for market failure in road infrastructure provision. We show why it may not be optimal from a welfare perspective to leave road provision fully to the market and government intervention in this sector can improve welfare. Government intervention comes in different forms, such as financial intervention (taxation, subsidies), regulation (price, quality, environmental), and public provision of roads or road services. The analysis of the literature regarding government instruments allows us to establish a correspondence between different forms of market failure and instruments. Several case studies of particular road infrastructure projects are included to illustrate the use of government instruments.